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04/08/2011: "The NSCN strongly reacts to the Press reports of India National Investigation Agency ( NIA) published in the local as well as Indian National papers on the 2nd and 3rd April 2011."

8 APRIL 2011
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF NAGALIM
Ministry of Information & Publicity

Press Release
7th April 2011.

The NSCN strongly reacts to the Press reports of India National Investigation Agency ( NIA) published in the local as well as Indian National papers on the 2nd and 3rd April 2011. The papers stated that Anthony Shimray gave the points in his statement before the NIA of his activities in procuring arms and ammunitions for the NSCN. We do not know the charge sheets framed against Anthony Shimray was actually the confessions of Shimray or to fabricating or false informations extracted from him through intimidations or factures. We have serious doubts, because the figures or amounts of the money involved in the so-called transactions did not tally between the 2nd April and 3rd April statements.

Secondly, the Saturday, the 2nd April paper stated that Anthony Shimray was arrested “near Patna” India. But actually he was arrested by the Indian Security Agencies in Katmandu, Nepal. The claim of the Government of India that Anthony Shimray was arrested near Patna is a blatant lie and concocted propaganda.

Thirdly, the Government of India or its agencies should understand the meaning of Cease-fire. The word cease-fire is invariably associated with the word wars. In wars, weapons whatever those may be, are used. There were and have been wars between the Nagas and Indians. It is known to all that Nagas have no arms and ammunition factories in their land. And that the Nagas have had to acquire any arms and ammunitions from all possible sources and places to fight in self defense. To be polite the Indo-Naga war is an act of aggression on the part of India and self defense or liberation task on the part of the Nagas.

Fourthly, the NSCN is no way and under no condition a terrorist organization. The NSCN cadres never ever do any acts of violence or terrorism in any other places including the entire India. The NSCN cadres activities are only confined to the Naga areas for self defense against the Indian and Myanmerese armies. At present, it is only because of the cease-fire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN, we do not impost or acquire any weapons otherwise what is the harm if NSCN procure arms and ammunitions to defend the land of the Nagas from any aggressor nations. The Nagas are sovereign people in Sovereign Country. So if need arises the Naga can procure any sort of weapons for self-defense as a sovereign people.

Fifthly, right from the beginning of political dialogue between the Indian and the NSCN leaders, the Indian leaders declared time and again that they were and are committed that the political stalemate between the Government of India and the NSCN was to be settled. They always asserted that the talks are going on in the right direction. Then why the Government of India is always serious about trifles. If they are really sincere and have strong political will to solve the Naga problem why they are creating themselves stumbling blocks and why they are so critical towards the NSCN unnecessarily. The Indian leaders should divert their attention to solving the vex issue instead of fumbling here and there. Political negotiation for more than 13 years is a matter of serious concern for the Nagas.

Lastly, the Government of India, in order to display their commitment and sincerity towards solving the Naga political issue, should release all Naga political prisoners or detainers without conditions including Anthony Shimray.

Issued by MIP.


GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF NAGALIM
Ministry of Information & Publicity

Press Release
4th April 2011.

On the eve of departure for Delhi for another round of Indo-Naga peace talks, His Excellency the Yaruiwo of Nagalim, Isak Chishi Swu convened Joint Council Meeting at Hebron on 4th March 2011 and briefed on the present status of the talks. The Yaruiwo also expressed positive outcome in the ensuing talks.

While stressing on the need for total commitment of the national workers to God, he quoted St. John 8:32 “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free”. The Yaruiwo further urged the Home Authorities to encourage one another and build up better co-ordination among them. He concluded his briefing with a note of caution to firmly shoulder the responsibilities placed on each one.

On the side of the Presidential briefings, Home comers numbering 38 (along with Arms and ammunitions) were also felicitated. Delivering the welcome address, Rh.Raising, Hon’ble Kilo Kilonser expressed happiness for the right step taken by them. He said, “to err is human but to rectify one’s mistake is wisdom”. He further stated that “if a man be fallen, he should not only stand up but also move foreword”. The Hon’ble Kilo Kilonser assured the home comers that “as long as we profess one faith, one Nation and one Principle, no force on earth can divide us”.

Speaking on behalf of the home comers, Kiyekhu Awomi, (Member NPAC) said “we do admit our misadventure as we were misinformed and misled. Kitovi said, “There is no agenda for political talks with the government of India and Naga Reconciliation”. In Khaplang’s Kehoi Camp we see no future, no political vision and no system of governance said Keyekhu. They are only indulged in amassing wealth for individuals. Therefore, with no future prospect for the Naga Nation, we have left Khehoi Camp and have come to serve the Nation under the leadership of Chairman Isak Chishi Swu and General Secretary Th.Muivah. We urge you to please forgive us of our mistake”. Shikato Chishi Swu (Kilonser Law & Justice) and Qhehoshi Chishi Swu (Dy.Kilonser NSW) also spoke in the same way.

Rev. A.Puni, V/P CNC pronounced the special blessing prayer for the Home comers.

Issued by MIP

Jamir set for comeback to state politics OUR CORRESPONDENT The Telegraph


S.C. Jamir
Kohima, April 4: Former Maharashtra governor and ex-chief minister of Nagaland, S.C. Jamir, will contest the May 8 byelection to the 26 Aonglenden Assembly constituency in Mokokchung district.
Medokhul Sophie, general secretary (administration) of Nagaland Congress said the election committee had recommended the former chief minister’s name to the party high command in New Delhi for consideration. “We have recommended his name to the AICC,” he said.
The Naga People’s Front (NPF), the main constituent of ruling Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN), is yet to finalise the name of its candidate. But Shilumar Ao, associate press secretary of the NPF, said, “We will finalise the name only after chief minister Neiphiu Rio is back from New Delhi.”
The NPF, which seems a bit upset with Jamir’s comeback into state politics, today said they would bring out old issues once again. “We will dig his grave again,” Ao said and added that the fight would be tough but the party would bring all skeletons out of Jamir’s closet once again.
There are over 5 applicants for the NPF ticket, sources said.
Some members of the Congress have held Jamir responsible for the downfall of the party since the 2003 state general elections. The slide had begun after publication of the booklet — Bedrock of Naga Society — in 2000, which stated that statehood had compromised the Nagas’ demand for sovereignty.
Jamir was also one of the founder members of the Nagaland state.
Bedrock of Naga Society became the main tool for the NPF in 2003 elections. But the Congress said the booklet was a closed chapter. Even Jamir said the booklet had served its purpose and therefore insisted that it should be a closed chapter.
Some senior members, however, were of the view that the former chief minister should not return to state politics.
Jamir said he was confident of winning the byelection. “We will contest to win,” he told The Telegraph.
On NPF’s intention to bring out old issues such as Bedrock of Naga Society, he said, “We have too many new issues to be discussed,” the former chief minister said.
“What old issues? Let them bring out,” he added.
The Congress in Nagaland has remained a divided house since 2003, after Jamir’s exit from state politics to become governor. A wider rift was created after last year’s Pradesh Congress Committee elections where Jamir’s brother Imtisungit Jamir contested for the post of the PCC president against incumbent I. Imkong.
Some members, still loyal to Jamir, were of the view that Jamir could salvage the party from further disintegration and mend the rift. But another camp said there would be wider division in the party if Jamir tries to take the mantle of the party again.
'IM' reacts against NIA charge against arrested Shimray Source: Hueiyen News Service
Tamenglong, April 01 2011: The NSCN (IM) today, reacting to the NIA's charge against Anthony Shimray of procuring arms and ammunition for the outfit, said that they do not know whether NIA framed the charges against him based on an actual confession or a fabricated one.

The reaction came in a statement issued today by the ministry of information and publicity, Government of the People's Republic of Nagalim (GPRN).

It reacts to the reports published in some local as well as national newspapers on the April 2 and 3 .

It said the newspapers stated that Anthony Shimray gave a statement before the NIA of his activities in procuring arms and ammunition for the NSCN.

The NSCN (IM)'s statement doubts the veracity of Anthony Shimray's information given to the NIA.

"We have serious doubts, because the figures or amounts of the money involved in the so-called transactions did not tally between the 2nd April and 3rd April statements" .

Some news reports had stated that Anthony Shimray was arrested "near Patna" .

But actually he was arrested by the Indian Security Agencies in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The statement claimed the GoI of spreading a blatant lie and a concocted propaganda.

Thirdly, the GoI or its agencies should understand the meaning of ceasefire.

The word ceasefire is invariably associated with the word war.

In wars, weapons whatever those may be, are used.

There were and have been wars between the Nagas and Indians.

It is known to all that Nagas have no arms and ammunition factories in their land.

And that the Nagas have had to acquire any arms and ammunitions from all possible sources to fight in self defence.

The Indo-Naga war is an act of aggression on the part of India and self defence or a liberation task on the part of the Nagas.

Fourthly, the NSCN is no way a terrorist organization.

The NSCN cadres never commit any acts of violence in the entire India.

The NSCN cadres' activities are only confined to the Naga areas for self defence against the Indian and Myanmerese armies.

At present, it is only because of the ceasefire agreement between the GoI and the NSCN, that we do not acquire any weapons otherwise what is the harm if NSCN procures arms and ammunitions to defend the land of the Nagas from any aggressor nations.

Fifthly, right from the beginning of the political dialogue between the Indian and the NSCN leaders, the Indian leaders declared time and again that they were and are committed that the political stalemate between the GoI and the NSCN was to be settled.

They always asserted that the talks are going on in the right direction.

Then why is the GoI always serious about trifles.

Why are they creating stumbling blocks and why are they so critical of the NSCN.

The Indian leaders should attend to solving the vexing issue instead.

Political negotiation for more than 13 years is a matter of serious concern for the Nagas.

Lastly, the Government of India, in order to display their commitment and sincerity towards solving the Naga political issue, should release all Naga political prisoners or detainees without conditionincluding Anthony Shimray, the statement issued by the MIP said.
The great Meitei Reconciliation Process: Revisiting the classical folklore on “Emoinu Chakhong Ngahongbi” by Late Shri Ningomabam Angouton Meetei Source: Sanjib Meitei Kangla on Line
Whenever I came across the word “Reconciliation”, what comes in my mind is the desperate move and appeals by Dr. Wati Aiyer’s The Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) to bring peace and unity among different Naga sub tribes. I’ll support the mission just after hearing its name mission because the phrase ‘Reconciliation and Unity’ is too good for me not to support it. It’s like democracy vs Nazism/Talibanism. The goal seems to be quite easily achievable since they are trying to unite people of a single tribe called Naga.
Often, we get to read beautifully phrased press releases from NSCN/GPRN endorsing the move and its commitment towards achieving the goal. Even the GPRN/NSCN and FGN endorse the move and express its desire to attend the highest level meeting of leaders from all the warring groups to sit down together and bring an everlasting solution in Naga society. Indeed, I too pray that peace prevails among the Nagas.
However the reality may be quite different from the press releases which covered the so called highest level meetings among the warring factions and occasional mass prayers. Random killing among the members of different groups, gunfights, accusation for territorial encroachments in eastern parts of Nagaland and Naga inhabitant districts of Arunanchal Pradesh, formation of ZUF, killing a few members of ZUF by NSCN/GPRN men are totally contradictory to all the press releases which have been published endlessly for a while in local media.
Well, why are Naga people still unable to unite themselves despite their common goal of making Nagaland a Land of Christ (again an apostle of Peace and Love)? The most basic reason is the insincerity of the leaders towards achieving the goal. Unity and peace is never possible unless people from different communities leave their false ego, exaggerated pride based on exaggerated history to show supremacy over others. You can take inspiration from the history but you can’t live with the history. Lack of heroic sacrifices from leaders and members of different communities for the sake of common Naga cause and thirst of power among leaders are also playing as obstacles for the process.
Here is where I start thinking that Nagas can learn from the process of Meitei reconciliation which happened much before King Nongada Lairen Pakhangba at 33 AD in Sana Leipak. I was always fascinated by classical Meitei folklores. The folklore of Emoinu Celebration from the story “Washak Ngakpa” meaning Keeping the Promise, written by Late Shri Ningombam Angouton Meetei and the classical love story “Khamba -Thoibi” are classical examples of successful reconciliation process of the old Meitei factions.
Although Washak Ngakpa is a story on how the Meiteis started celebrating Emoinu Day by lighting fire torches on roadside and worshiping the goddess Emoinu at ‘Funga Lairu’, the great Meitei reconciliation process was the backbone of the story when the story line is viewed at an angle different from the typical storyline. Let me tell you the story briefly:
Once upon a time, there were four kings ruling four independent kingdoms. The kings were Khuman Kwakpa, Meitei King Thawan Thaba, Selloi Nongmai Ningthou and Chingshanglakpa. There had been a mutual understanding among the kings and were friendly nations. However, the relationship between the Meitei king and Khuman Kwakpa deteriorated and in a meeting, they declared that they would no more be friends and severed all ties between them. Incidentally, the wife of Khuman Kwakpa was a Meitei woman named “Piyainu”. After returning from the meeting, the king Khuman Kwakpa summoned all his ministers and narrated the new developments in the severed ties between Meiteis and Khumans. He also promised that he would divorce his wife Piyainu since he didn’t want to be a bad example in front of the Khuman people.
Till then, he was unaware of the fact that Piyainu was already pregnant with his child. He ordered Piyainu to leave the palace immediately. Piyainu pleaded that she was already pregnant and requested him to allow her to stay till the child is born in Khuman palace. Even the ministers tried to persuade the king but Khuman Kwakpa, known for his principle of keeping promise did not bend. Piyainu had no option but prayed to the Godess of Khuman Kingdom “Emoinu Chakhong Ngahongbi” to show a miracle which would trigger a change in the stand of Khuman Kwakpa. But, nothing happened and finally Piyainu took a stand to return to Meitei land.
For once, she prayed to Emoinu that if she was innocent and a true Meitei woman who kept the virtue of married woman sincerely, then she be blessed to get to live with Emoinu Eema. Time passed, Piyainu got a son whom she named Chalamba. Chalamba grew up without knowing who his father was and he was prohibited by his mother from venturing into the land towards the south east direction of Meitei land. The reason was simple; the kindom in the sout east direction of Meitei land was ruled by enemy. During that time, there was a Meitei tradition of appeasing goddess “Meitei Yumjao Lairembi” as per the instructions of oracles. One year, an oracle forecasted that goddess “Yumjao Lairembi” would be pleased if a live deer could be offered to Her.
Chalamba was also one of the Meitei youths who set out to hunt a deer. They tried everywhere except the south east land but could not get any deer. Chalamba decided to go to the south east land for hunting without informing his mother. As he moved into the north eastern terrains, he saw a deer running away. He started chasing the deer with a promise that the first sighted deer should be offered to Yumjao Lairembi. During the chase, the deer passed through a forest which was full of yairi grasses (Rubus idens) making a loud sound. The placed was named “Yairipok”.
Finally, the deer ran into the palace of Khuman Kwakpa and hide below the throne of the king. Khuman Kwakpa told Chalamba that since the deer took refuge from him, it’s his duty to protect the animal and if Chalamba loved his life, then he should return to Meitei land without any further delay. But, Chalamba refused to budge and challenged the king to fight with him in person. Kwakpa agreed and took on Chalamba. However, despite of all his fighting skills and reputation of being a great worrier, he couldn’t defeat Chalamba. Finaly, Kwakpa, impressed with the strength of Chalamba, halted the fight and inquired about the parents of Chalamba. Chalamba told him that Piyainu is the name of his mother but he didn’t know who his father was. Kwakpa inquired more and it became clear that Chalamba was his own son. To be sure, he sent Chalamba back to Meitei land to ask to his mother whether she wanted the deer or anything else expecting that Piyainu would ask for the kingdom. Chalamba returned to his mother to ask her choice.
Piyainu told her son to ask Khuman Kwakpa to make a promise that he would hand over what she had asked for and if Kwakpa comply with the demand, then asked him to handover “Emoinu Chahong Ngaongbi”. Chalamba returned to Kwakpa who was waiting for him along with his ministers. Chalamba asked Kwakpa if he would promise to give what his mother had asked for else give the deer back. Kwakpa promised that he would give anything what Piyainu had asked for. Chalamba asked Kwakpa to give Emoinu Chahongbi. Kwakpa, the worshipper of Emoinu Ema Ahongbi, was shocked but his perception that Chalamba was his own son was vindicated. He could not imagine the demand. Due to Emoinu Ahongbi, prosperity in Khuman land was happening. Kwakpa told Chalamba to take back the demand. Instead of that demand, Kwakpa asked him to take whatever he liked from Khuman land be it gold, land, and even the throne. He also told Chalamba that Chalamba himself was the legal heir of the Khuman throne.
Chalamba told Kwakpa to return the deer and he was not interested in any of the offers from a King who couldn’t keep his promise. Kwakpa, gave in to the demand and handover Emoinu Chahongbi to Chalamba. Chalamba, despite his poor upbringing by single mother could not be lured away by mouth watering offers from Khuman Kwakpa (his father) and sacrificed every personal and materialistic gain that he could have achieved for the sake of the welfares of Meiteis. Chalamba brought Emoinu Chahong Ngahongbi to Meiteiland without war and bloodshed. Piyainu lit up the street to welcome the Goddess Emoinu Chakhong Ngahongbi. Finally, truth won the battle.
Of course, the unbreakable bond of love between Meiteis and Khumans had been developed by brave Chalamba and the King of principle Khuman Kwakpa. He kept his promise despite his personal losses. He applied the same yardstick to define his principle even when it hit him hard. Had Khuman Kwakpa not kept his promise, who knows, there could have been more wars and bloodshed between Meiteis and Khumans.
In the story by Late Shri Ningombam Angouton Meetei, the principle of Khuman Kwakpa who despite being the king accepted the challenge from an unknown lad to fight in person, raw courage of Chalamba with total devotion to his motherland that could not be lured by materialistic comforts, Piyainu, the woman of virtue who brought up her son and kept him grounded are depicted beautifully and still classic examples of Meitei civilization based on tolerance, courage, virtue, good family upbringing and patriotism.
Such kinds of characters are required to bring reconciliation among the warring tribes in the context of Naga reconciliation process. Leaders of Naga factions need to be more sincere and back up their numerous press releases with actions. Like Khuman Kwakpa, they need to stick to their principles, promises, apply same yardsticks for defining sacrifices that need to be made for reconciliation and more importantly they should be selfless. The restraint shown by Khuman Kwakpa when an unknown lad from enemy land challenged him should be classic example of how the leaders should lead the people by example.
Just shouting that we should unite for the sake of Christ will not bring real reconciliation and unity. Mass prayer is good but actions should reflect the intention and motive behind the slogan. Khamba Thoibi is famous for its classical love story between an orphan Khamba and princess Thoibi while a rich, talented and cunning Angom Nongban, son of a Minister of then Moirang kingdom tried to win the hand of princess Thoibi at any cost.
Apart from the love story, it depicts the strain relationship between Moirangs and Khumans. The two kingdoms continued their hate relationship till the brave Khuman Khamba took on the ‘Kau’ that lived in Eekop lake and terrorized the people of Khuman which had been hindering people from going out for fishing. The incident brought together the warring communities viz., the Khumans and the Moirangs closely.
Whatever the claim by some of the Naga leaders, reconciliation seems to be still a far line from reach for the Naga groups. Highest level meetings will not be effective unless the general public from different groups are determined to reconcile. The motto of forgive and forget the past enmity needs to be sincerely practiced.
Last but not the least, hating and blaming Meiteis for the backwardness of tribal people of Manipur may not be correct political move at all. I do not support the the idea of greater Nagalim but sincerely support the unity and peace process initiated by various civil organizations.
Sanjib Meitei
THE SITUATION IN KAREN STATE AFTER THE ELECTIONS EBO Analysis Paper No. 1/2011

For over sixty years the Karens have been fighting the longest civil war in recent history. The struggle,
which has seen demands for an autonomous state changed to equal recognition within a federal union, has been bloody and characterized by a number of splits within the movement.

While all splinter groups ostensibly split to further ethnic Karen aspirations; recent decisions by some to
join the Burmese government’s Border Guard Force (BGF) is seen as an end to such aspirations. Although
a number of Karen political parties were formed to contest the November elections, the likelihood of
such parties seriously securing appropriate ethnic representation without regime capitulation is doubtful.

While some have argued, perhaps correctly, that the only legitimate option was to contest the elections,
the closeness of some Karen representatives to the current regime can only prolong the status quo. This
papers examines the problems currently affecting Karen State after the 7 November elections.

THE BORDER GUARD FORCE

Despite original promises of being allowed to recruit a total of 9,000 troops, the actual number of
the DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) or Karen Border Guard Force has been reduced
considerably. In fact, a number of the original offers made to the DKBA have been revoked. At a 7
May 2010 meeting held at Myaing Gyi Ngu, DKBA Chairman U Tha Htoo Kyaw stated that ‘According
to the SE Commander, the BGF will retain the DKBA badge.’ In fact the DKBA were given uniforms
with SPDC military patches and all Karen flags in DKBA areas were removed and replaced by the
national flag.

In regards to numbers, Deputy DKBA commander Bo Kyaw Htun Hlaing stated that ‘We are an army
so we have to act like an army, all our soldiers will be given a salary [and] we estimate that our six
thousand troops will continue but we need to add 3000 more.’ In fact the DKBA was separated into
10 Battalions, each consisting of 400 men (not including Burmese Officers); the total number finally
allowed was 4,200 with 2,360 weapons available in total.1



The DKBA was also affected by SPDC pruning in relation to age, criminal record and physical fitness.
This affected them to such a degree that at least two thousand troops were forced to leave the
army. While there are no exact figures available, it is likely that most of these former troops
returned home to their farms with at least some being given pensions, but for what duration is
unclear.

The inauguration of the first BGF Battalions began on the 21 August 2010 with the formation of the
South-East Command BGF at Paingkyon, Hlaingbwe and attended by former DKBA commander Kyaw
Than. This was followed by the formation of Border Guard Forces at Mepale, Myawaddy, Atwin
Kwin Kalay, Myawaddy and Hti Hu Than in Kawkareik.

After acceptance into the BGF, DKBA troops were ordered to return their arms and were given new
Burma Army weapons. These weapons are strictly controlled and issued on a needs basis by Burma
Army Commanders. BGF troops are not allowed to carry weapons without SPDC authorization and
are provided with only a small amount of ammunition which must be strictly accounted for. In
addition to new weapons and uniforms, each battalion has been promised six vehicles - 1 for the
BGF commander, 1 for the 2nd battalion Commander, 1 for general HQ use, and also three large
trucks for general use.

A seven man advisory committee was also formed consisting of U Tha Htoo Kyaw, Kyaw Than,
Maung Kyi, Pyia Pyia, Pah Nwee, Maung Chit Thu (taking responsibility for business activities) and
Tun Hlaing. Each advisor has been promised 400,000 kyat per month. If an advisor wants to retire,
they will be given 200,000 kyat as a one off payment and will not receive a pension.2 At the BGF
transformation meeting held in Pa-an on 6 October 2010 it was stated that the DKBA would be
restructured along the following lines: Eastern Salween - two battalions, western Salween - two
battalions, two HQ battalions, Maung Chit Thu would have six battalions while both Moe Tho and
Saw Blu would have one battalion each, in total there would be 14 battalions,3 two of which would
be held in reserve.4

While the majority of the DKBA were prepared to accept the BGF proposal, the SPDC’s plans for fully
incorporating the DKBA into the Border Guard Force program were destroyed by the failure of the
DKBA’s 5th Brigade Commander Colonel Lah Pwe (aka Nakhamwe) to agree.6

THE KLO HTOO BAW BATTALION AND THE ATTACK ON MYAWADDY

Concerns over Colonel Lah Pwe’s intentions had already been aired by Kyaw Than during the
transformation meeting with an SPDC delegation on 8 October 2010. Kyaw Than had asked Gen.
Maung Maung Ohn what he should do about Nakhamwe and the General replied that:

‘It depends on his will; we have given him one month. We will fight if he does not come back.
That’s all. There are no insurgencies allowed on the border after the election. All DKBA must
become a Border Guard Force. At the end of 2010 everyone must be a Border Guard Force or
we will seize all people with weapons…, we are not allowed to leave the KNU on the border -
we will clean everything, we have a lot of troops - we don’t need to worry.’

Despite such threats, Colonel Lah Pwe, commanding a force of approximately four hundred men, has
remained steadfast that he would not surrender, stating in one interview that:

‘I am a DKBA soldier and will fight for my people… Even if they tell me to give them my
weapons and badge, I will never hand them over. That would be like taking our bones and
just leaving flesh.’7

In addition, Colonel Lah Pwe had signalled strongly that he had no intention of re-joining the KNLA
noting that ’…he will continue to fight as a DKBA soldier.’8 Instead, he has adopted the name Klo
Htoo Baw (Yellow Gold Drum) battalion and currently controls 902, 901, 905, 907, 903, and the
newly formed 909 battalion, the latter is under his direct control and consists of at least 200 armed
troops.

While there was little doubt that Colonel Lah Pwe would not surrender, the seizure of Myawaddy
town on the Thai-Burma Border by troops loyal to him came as a surprise to many. As the election
was underway on 7 November 2010, at least 80 troops from 902 Battalion, under the command of
Major Kyaw Thet, began seizing various buildings in the town.

Original reports of the town’s seizure were met with some incredulity with media outlet Mizzima
contacting a number of officials both within the KNU and people in the town.9 KNU vice-chairman
David Thakabaw was quoted as saying that:

‘We heard this news too. It’s impossible because there are a lot of junta troops stationed in
Myawaddy. If this news is true, we will see a lot of fighting with these troops.’

While Border Guard Force (BGF) Battalion 1019 Commander Lieutenant Colonel Saw Hlaing Thein
stressed:

‘How can Myawaddy be seized without firing a single shot? Did he seize the town in person?
Which place did he seize – a bush? This news is nonsense. When we were in the KNU we had
to fight hard to enter Myawaddy. I doubt if he could enter Myawaddy without firing a single
shot. Myawaddy is currently calm and quiet. Military Operation Command 19 has more than 4,000 personnel and the BGF has more than 4,000 troops deployed in Myawaddy. It’s not true.’

A Burmese Immigration officer also commented:
‘No, this is not true. It would be clear if it was true. One would hear gunfire in the town and
notice that something in the town is different. It must be a trick. If it were true, you would
find DKBA soldiers in uniform roaming in the town. They’re not allowed even to wear their
uniforms here, let alone bear arms.’

The fact that the move came as some surprise to the KNU was further supported by its secretary 1,
Major Saw Hla Ngwe:

‘When I contacted my men in Myawaddy, they replied to me that enemy outposts had been
overrun. We can’t confirm this news. We haven’t seen anything overrun, seizures or
positioning of DKBA troops, based on our understanding of military training and tactics.
There are no signs of occupation of the town. There are no facts to support or confirm these
reports.’

The actions of the DKBA seem to have taken at least the higher members of the Karen Nation Union
by surprise. With the Border Guard Force issue looming, the KNU had appointed a special
representative, Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung, to handle DKBA affairs. However, it would appear that
this had produced little in the two sides’ abilities to work with each other. Instead, Lah Pwe had
been in direct contact with the KNLA via its 101 Battalion commander.

From the outset, it looked as if the Myawaddy attack, which began at 8:40 in the morning, may have
been the rogue action of the 902 commander Major Kyaw Htet. Earlier, on 20 September 2010,
Kyaw Thet and approximately 20 of his soldiers had surrounded a Police station in ward four of
Myawaddy. The troops were apparently seeking to force the police into returning unlicensed cars
that had been seized earlier. A tense standoff continued until the arrival of BA troops who, in turn,
besieged the DKBA until Kyaw Thet finally withdrew.10 Despite this, and knowing that Kyaw Thet
was allied with Lah Pwe, the Burmese authorities had made no move to restrict the group’s
movements or disarm them. Instead, they were allowed to continue their duties of manning trading
gates along the Moei River. This meant that 902 troops were already in the town and it thus
expedited their ability to quickly seize a number of important government building and secure the
Thai-Burma friendship bridge.

After the outbreak of hostilities, Colonel Lah Pwe was soon quoted explaining the reasons for the
attack as:

‘They *Burmese army+ announced that they will shoot people who don’t vote *in today’s
elections]. So people called on us to seize the town… In order to win votes in the elections,
[the junta] is bullying and forcing people to vote. But the people want to boycott [the vote],
so the soldiers are holding them at gunpoint and our troops had to intervene and take sides
with the people.’11

Who actually called on Lah Pwe to seize the town is unclear, although it has been reported that
Kyaw Thet had already stated that it was his intention to seize the town at least the day before.12 It
was also reported that a number of threats by the Township Election Committee had been made
consistently every day since 3 November 2010. Colonel Lah Pwe maintains that these threats
ordered all people to vote for the USDP and those who didn’t would be shot.13 One of the DKBA’s
Tactical Operations Commanders in the town, prior to 7 November, confirms that the Election
Committee had ordered all villagers to vote and, while he does not remember a specific threat to
shoot people being made, there had been an increase in Burma Army patrols in the town in what he
believes was an attempt to intimidate the local population.14

Regardless of the reason, the subsequent fighting, which lasted most of the morning of Monday, 8
November 2010, killed three and injured twenty.15 In addition, an 81mm artillery shell and three
shells from an M79 launcher landed in Thailand injuring 19 people and killing one. By Monday night,
over 12,000 people had sought sanctuary in Thailand and this would increase to over 20,000 by the
next day.

The Burma Army had originally fled from its positions when DKBA troops began operations against
them and it appears they were ill-equipped to deal with the attacks until reinforcements arrived.
Further fighting soon erupted along the Thai-Burma border, including at Colonel Lah Pwe’s main
headquarters at Waley and also at Phaya Thonsu (Three Pagoda’s Pass), the latter resulting in over
4,000 people fleeing across the border. It appears that the DKBA action at Phaya Thonsu was
supported by KNLA troops from 16 Battalion, 6th Brigade, suggesting that although the KNU
leadership had not been informed of the DKBA’s actions, at least local KNLA commanders were
aware and prepared. According to media reports, the combined DKBA/KNLA force burnt down
various military and government offices including those of the Special Bureau (SB), Agriculture,
Forestry, and Post and Telegraph Departments on Monday, 8 November. By Tuesday, 9 November
2010, Karen troops had retreated.

Completely ignoring the fact that the attacks had been conducted by Colonel Lah Pwe’s troops, the
New Light of Myanmar was quick to blame the violence on the Karen National Union:

‘A group of KNU terrorists from south of Myawady opened fire with heavy weapons at five
different places in Myawady at about 8.45 am yesterday. A total of three innocent were
killed and 20 injured in the incident. The injured were rushed to Myawady hospital and
provided with necessary treatment by officials concerned. Due to shootings of KNU
terrorists, shells of heavy weapons also exploded near Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge and
Chinese temple in Maesot in Thailand, leaving some innocent people injured. In [a] similar
incident at noon yesterday, a group of KNU terrorists opened fire of small and heavy
weapons from north of Phaya Thonsu in Kayin State, causing one member of Myanmar Police
Force dead and four Tatmadaw members and one service personnel of the Township Forest
Department injured.’16

The Karen National Union’s response stated that:

‘We, the Karen National Union (KNU), strongly condemn recent attacks by Burma’s military
regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), on Myawaddy Town and several
other locations in Burma’s border areas, where at least 3 civilians were killed, and more
injured. These latest attacks are part of the SPDC’s systematic violence against Burma’s
ethnic peoples.

The conflict in Myawaddy began on 7 November, the day of Burma’s first elections in 20
years, when civilians complained of being threatened and intimidated to vote for the junta-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), rather than the local Karen party
which was their preference. Brigade-5 of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) led by
Colonel Saw Lah Bwe – who refused to transform to the Border Guard Force under the
control of SPDC Army – took control of Myawaddy to protect these people, without using
weapons. Col Saw Lah Bwe had said that he expected the SPDC Army to enter into
negotiation to resolve the situation.

However, on Monday, the 8th of November 2010, at 9 a.m., the SPDC Army responded with
machine guns and rocket propelled grenades, despite the presence of many civilians in the
town… These attacks are all part of the SPDC’s policy of eliminating ethnic opposition,
including ceasefire groups that have refused to be under its direct control as a Border Guard
Force, as required by their 2008 Constitution.

The SPDC has accused the KNU of carrying out these attacks. However, the KNU and DKBA
Brigade-5 share the same policy not to hurt civilians but to protect them. The KNU supports
the DKBA’s actions as they were taken in resistance to the SPDC’s elections that do not
represent any progress towards creating a democratic federal union in which the ethnic
people’s fundamental human rights would be protected.’17

One KNU official has noted that it is common for most Burmese authorities to threaten civilians
when they want something. It is unlikely therefore that such a threat, in context, would be the sole
reason for the DKBA to seize the town, especially if Kyaw Thet had already announced his intention
prior to 7 November.

In response to the Myawaddy attack, the Burma Army, initially caught off guard, retaliated by
launching a number of operations around Phaya Thonsu, Kya-in-Seikkyi, Kanelay, Phalu, and Waley.
In one instance, on the evening of 10 November until the early morning the following day, the
Burma Army indiscriminately fired 139 artillery shells into Kya-in-Seikkyi killing a 17 year-old girl and
wounding her brother.18 There were also reports of a least one village headman being beaten to
death and that villagers had also been forced to porter for Burmese troops.

By 11 November, the Burma Army had entered Waley town after a sustained shelling campaign and
razed a number of buildings including the house of Lah Pwe. In a somewhat belated attempt to
curtail the activities of any DKBA forces left in the area, Police and Burma Army troops also began
searching, on 15 October, the houses of DKBA members in Myawaddy and apparently confiscated all
military equipment and uniforms.19

Clashes between the Burma army, the DKBA, and the KNLA have continued as Burma Army
reinforcements have been dispatched to areas where Karen resistance forces operate. Civilians have
frequently been forced to flee across the Thai-Burma border. However Thai authorities are reluctant



to house any more refugees, and civilians are frequently ordered back or are forced to hide along
the border. On 28 November 2010, the village of Phalu came under attack forcing an estimated
thousand villagers to flee across the border. Phalu, between Myawaddy and Waley, came under
attack as 2nd Battalion DKBA forces in the area tried to defend their outpost and prevent a supply
and escape corridor being opened up to Waley. Fighting has continued constantly since November
resulting in yet more villagers fleeing across the Thai border.

In its 15 February 2011 Analysis report, the Back Pack Health Workers Team (BPHWT) estimated that
by 12 February 2011, it and local CBOs were caring for over 10,000 civilians, living in unrecognized
hiding sites, along the Thai-Burma Border.20 Despite the fact that fighting continues, Thai authorities
have continued to send villagers fleeing fighting back across the border. In one incident, on 13
January 2011, soldiers from the Royal Thai Army burnt down shelters at a temporary hiding site in
Phop Phra district in an effort to force the 436 villagers seeking refuge there to return to Burma.21 In
addition to those people seeking shelter in Thailand, it is estimated that there may be up to 10,000
displaced people hiding in Burma.22

It would appear that the timing of the DKBA attack, and perhaps the lack of coordination with the
KNU and the KNLA as a whole, rather than just 6th Brigade units, may have been a tactical and
political error. While there was little doubt that there would be an escalation in conflict, not only on
the Thai border but also on China’s as well, such an action was not envisioned so soon. An attack on
a major trading town could only provide the Burmese regime with yet more support for what could
now be legitimately categorized as anti-terrorist operations.

While it may be argued that the DKBA’s actions were conducted to present legitimate grievances, to
draw attention to the Burmese people’s plight and to show the illegality of the elections, the timing
and the methodology employed were perhaps somewhat flawed. Consequently, the eastern border
from Myawaddy town down to Three Pagoda’s Pass has once more become a free-fire zone on a
scale unseen prior to 1998. The number of refugees fleeing to Thailand is the worst since the 1997
offensive and villagers continue to flee or hide in small groups in Thailand.

Despite the fact that Lah Pwe continues to maintain that the Klo Htoo Baw Battalion is separate from
the Karen National Union, the State Peace and Development Council, perhaps to distance the group
from the then pro-regime DKBA, has designated them KNU (Saw La Pwe [sic]). According to an
article published in the New Light of Myanmar on 15 March 2011, fifty-one members of Saw La
Pwe’s group had ‘exchanged arms for peace’ since December 2010.23

THE ELECTION AND THE WINNING POLITICAL PARTIES

Despite the Klo Htoo Baw’s actions on the 7 November 2010, a number of Karen representatives
were voted into various legislative bodies. Originally, four Karen parties had been formed to contest
the election: the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party (PSDP), The Kayin People’s Party (KPP), the Kayin
State Democracy and Development Party (KSDDP), and the Union Kayin League (UKL). The latter
party was eventually dissolved leaving three remaining Karen parties, the All Mon Regional
Development Party (AMRDP) and the regime’s Union Solidarity and Democracy Party (USDP) to
contest the elections in Karen State.

Of the three Karen parties, the PSDP was considered to be the most independent. The KSDPP,
believed to be created by SPDC Information Minister Kyaw San and funded by the regime, was made
of ex-members of the DKBA and KPF. While the KPP, one of whose members was Dr Simon Tha of
the Karen Peace Council, were also considered close to the junta.

Election results confirmed the PSDP as the strongest winner with 9 members elected while the KPP
had 4 and the KSDPP received 2. The AMDRP got 3 with a further seat going to an independent, the
regime’s own party, the USDPP received 13 seats.


The Phalon-Sawaw Party, along with the Shan National Democratic Party (SNDP), the All Mon Region
Democracy Party (AMRDP), the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) and the Chin
National Party (CNP), has called for a lifting of sanctions in a joint statement made on 15 January
2011. This in itself echoes a similar call for a sanctions review based on conservation, social affairs
and human rights factors made by the NLD on 4 January 2011.24 In addition, the five parties also
called on the current and incoming governments to reserve one vice-presidency in the Nationalities'
Parliament for an ethnic representative, as well as one speaker or deputy-speaker in either the
People’s Parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) or Lower House (Amyotha Hluttaw).

In March, the Karen State Hluttaw legislative committee was formed. The committee consists of 7
members including 3 State Hluttaw representatives and what was defined as 4 suitable citizens.
Those nominated were U Saw Aung Pwint as Chairman, U Aung Kyaw Lin (Kayin State Law Office) as
Secretary and U Min Aung Lin of Hlaingbwe Township No.1 Constituency. The 4 suitable citizens
were Advocate U Maung Pu (a) U Kyaw Win, Advocate U Khin Si and Major Tun Tun Oo and Captain
Zaw Min Tun as Defence Services Personnel representatives.25

The State Hluttaw National Races Affairs Committee was also formed consisting of 3 State Hluttaw
representatives and 4 suitable citizens. Phado Aung San, Papun Township No.2 Constituency, was
nominated as Chairman, U Saw Shar Tunt Phaung, Hlaingbwe Township No.2 Constituency, as
Secretary and U Saw J A Win Myint of Thandaunggyi Township No.2. The four citizens are Daw Nan
Than Than Lwin, U Khun Min Aung, U Mya Soe, and U Min Aung Win.26

ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN KAREN STATE

CONCLUSION
The situation in Karen State, after the election, has, due to the seizing of Myawaddy on 7 November
2010, deteriorated, especially in areas which, prior to the arrival of the BGF issue, had been
relatively peaceful. While there is little doubt that conflict would have affected these areas
eventually, the timing of the attack and the lack of coordination with other armed groups has
resulted in an increase in armed conflict and has impacted on the lives of over 20,000 civilians, many
of whom remain displaced and vulnerable.

While the new constitution clearly states that there can be only one armed force in the country and,
therefore, suggests heightened conflict in Karen State was inevitable; the timing of the attack has
negated any other possible avenues of negotiation therefore resulting in increased conflict as
remaining the main option available.

There have been many attempts to denigrate the elections, yet the fact remains that a number of
ethnic representatives have now been elected. While it is too early to say whether these parties will
be able to contribute meaningfully to addressing the ethnic issue, it must be recognized that an
opportunity not earlier available has been created and should therefore be supported as an
alternative to conflict.

In relation to the Border Guard Force, it would appear that little has changed in its operations
towards the local villagers. While it is still too early to fully analyse the activities of BGF units,
reports have already emerged of abuses by at least one BGF unit in Karen areas. As the Karen
Human Rights Group (KHRG) notes:

‘On November 29th 2010 Saw T---, a 27-year-old man from Lu Pleh Township, Pa'an District
was arrested, tortured and executed by soldiers from Tatmadaw Border Guard Force
Battalion #1015, following accusations that he had made contact with and provided
information to the KNU. In a separate incident that occurred on November 19th 2010 Saw
M---, a 75-year-old man, was executed at point blank range by soldiers from a different unit
of the same Border Guard Force Battalion #1015, after being asked to step outside his house
in Dta Greh Township, Pa'an District...’27

Most recently, it appears that both Kyaw Than and Maung Chit Thoo, who had been made advisors,
have now been asked to take command of BGF operations against the KNLA and Klo Htoo Baw
Battalion. This is primarily due to a lack of trust between Burma Army commanders and the Karen
troops in the BGF units. In addition, recent reports have also suggested that the initial number of
troops assigned to attend combat operations have now been reduced from 400 to 160.

There seems to be little to suggest that, after the election, the situation in Karen State will improve.
The creation of the Border Guard Force and the failure of the SPDC to incorporate the DKBA’s 5th
Brigade, has resulted in an increase in conflict. While some limited political space has been created
there is little to suggest it will have an immediate impact. However, if supported, over time this
could result in limited improvement at least in areas not directly affected by conflict.

In the short-term, as conflict between the Burma Army and KNU/Klo Htoo Baw Battalion intensifies,
Thailand, and the international community, must prepare for an escalation of abuses against the

Karen population and consequently an increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced
people needing assistance. There is little doubt that until the military regime recognises the fact
that continued conflict cannot solve the ethnic issues plaguing the country, the situation in Karen
State will continue to deteriorate regardless of the changing political landscape.

BACKGROUND

Under colonial administration Burma was divided into two very distinct entities: Burma proper or
ministerial Burma, consisting only of what are now the majority divisions of the country, and the
excluded areas which were comprised of what is now Karen State (then known as the Karen Salween
Hill tracts), Chin State (Chin Hills), Arakan State (Naga Hills) and Kachin and Shan States (Federated
Shan States).

Fighting in World War II had continued largely along the ethnic boundaries drawn by the colonial
government. Many of the ethnic groups, including the Karen, Kachin and Chin, continued to support
the British and fought against the Japanese and the Burma Independence Army. It was this support
for the allies that led many of them to believe that the British would honour their calls for separation
from an independent Burma under what was feared would be a Burman dominated government.

After joining with the British to force the Japanese retreat, Aung San formed a provisional
government, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which included among its members
a number of ethnic representatives. Although being given some representation, many of the ethnic
groups still believed that the British would support their calls for independence.

As far as it was concerned, the British government had already made allowances for the former
frontier areas to be given special dispensation for self-rule in any future independent Burma. Aung
San and a number of AFPFL representatives were invited to London for discussions with then Prime
Minister Clement Attlee. Despite the fact that Attlee had received a cable from the Shan Sawbas
stating that ‘Aung San and his delegation did not represent the Shan and the frontier areas’ talks
continued.28 The result was that the Aung San – Attlee agreement, originally designed to give the
country full self-government within the commonwealth, stated that ethnic states could decide for
themselves if they wished to join with the Union of Burma. It also stated that a conference to
discuss ethnic representation must be arranged by the AFPFL.29

The subsequent conference, held at Panglong in Shan State on the 12th of February 1947, resulted in
the signing of what became known as the Panglong agreement.30 This agreement provided for
autonomy for both the Shan and Chin states as well as the future demarcation for a Kachin state.31
However, it was not inclusive, and Karen representatives, under the political leadership of the Karen
Central Organisation32, refused actual participation in the Panglong conference due to the fact that
its own AFPFL members had not been included in the London delegation.

The ethnic issue was later addressed in the 1947 constitution which included a provision that ethnic
states could secede from the Union, but not within 10 years of the constitution coming into law.33 It
also included a provision for an autonomous Karen State or ‘Kaw-thu-lay’ based on the ‘Salween
district and such adjacent areas occupied by the Karens as may be determined by a special
commission appointed by the President.’ But this was to be decided after independence. The Karen
issue was further complicated by factional in-fighting. A number of Karen groups had met to create
the Karen National Union (KNU), led by AFPFL member Saw Ba U Gyi, in February 1947. In March
1947, in response to the AFPFL failure to include Karen representatives in its London delegation, Saw
Ba U Gyi resigned his post. This was then taken by San Po Thin, leader of the Karen Youth
Organisation (KYO), who quickly allied himself to the AFPFL.34 The KYO supported the creation of a
Karen State as demarcated in the 1947 constitution, while the KNU sought a much larger area
including access to a seaboard. The KNU began to train its own defence force, the Karen National
Defence Organisation (KNDO) which was inaugurated on 15 July 1947.

Two days later, on the 17th of July 1947, Aung San and six members of his cabinet, including Mahn Ba
Khaing of the KYO, were assassinated. Aung San was immediately replaced by U Nu as leader of the
AFPFL and chief of the cabinet. U Nu hoped that he would be able to solve the Karen issue with the
provision laid down for a future Karen State in the 1947 constitution. Although U Nu was supported
by San Po Thin and the KYO, the KNU refused to accept the areas given. The Karen leadership stated
that it could not accept the constitution because ’…*it+ does not include the granting of a state to the
Karen to satisfy their aspirations.’ Instead they demanded the creation of a Karen State to include
Tenesserim Division, Taungoo District, Irrawaddy Division, Insein District, Hanthawaddy District, and
Nyaunglebin sub-district.’

Although the KNDO had successfully defended Rangoon from communist attack, ethnic tensions
between the Karen and Burman were still high. The Karen call for a separate Karen country had still
not been adequately resolved. In addition, U Nu had openly accused the KNU of seeking to set up a
parallel government in Karen areas and of attempting to buy large shipments of arms. The press
seized upon the stories and their publication further stoked communal tensions.

With the prospect of communal violence and a fear that the Karen were preparing to take control of
the capital, U Nu began training local militia units, the Sitwundans, under the command not of the
army chief of Staff, an ethnic Karen, but the war office under Aung Gyi.35 The Sitwundans and local
UMP units began to order the KNDO units to disarm. On Christmas Eve 1948, in the Karen village of
Palaw, Sitwundans disarmed the local Karen UMP units, and, not long after, threw grenades into the
village church. Over 80 Karen villagers were killed in the first of many such incidents.

Despite a number of talks between U Nu and Saw Ba U Gyi, the situation continued to deteriorate as
Sitwundans entered Karen areas and Karen forces began to seize a number of key cities including
Taungoo, Tantabin and Pyu. Government forces attacked the Karen areas of Thamaing and Ahlone
with automatic gunfire and mortars, shooting down innocent civilians as they fled their burning
homes.36 Finally, the government declared the KNDO illegal and two days later Karen forces took
Insein in what would be a 112 days standoff before the Karen’s retreat.



By 1950, the Burma Army had been reformed and had begun to take back a number of previously
lost towns and cities. In March, they were able to take the Karen headquarters in the city of
Taungoo. In August, the Karen suffered another disaster when their leader, Saw Ba U Gyi, was
captured and killed.

The ethnic issue, and what would become known later as the federal issue, continued to be left
unanswered. In what the military considered a compromise, U Nu arranged a federal seminar to
take place on the 25th of February 1962 to amend the constitution and give greater rights to the
ethnic minorities. Fearing the country’s collapse, Ne Win seized power on 2 March 1962 and
detained U Nu and over thirty Karenni and Shan leaders. The 1947 constitution, and the rights of the
minorities to secede, was suspended.

In 1988, student led protests were brutally crushed by the regime. This resulted in a number of
students fleeing to ethnic areas and soon Burman student armies were organized and trained to
fight against the regime. The arrival of the student movement led to the creation of the Democratic
Alliance of Burma (DAB), which saw the creation of a joint ethnic-Burman front consisting of the ten
ethnic resistance armies of the NDF and 12 Burmese opposition parties.37 The NDF and DAB would
be joined by the government-in-exile, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
(NCGUB) (formed in 1990), the National League for Democracy – Liberated Areas (NLD-LA) (formed
in 1991), in the creation, on 22 September 1992, of the all-inclusive National Council Union of Burma
(NCUB).

The Karen Headquarters at Manerplaw became the de-facto capital of the resistance movement,
both pro-democratic and ethnic. However, the situation within the Karen National Union was not
stable. In 1994, a number of KNLA troops split to form the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).
This split, due to perceived religious and social discrimination against the Buddhist Karen, would
later result in the loss of the KNU’s main headquarters at Manerplaw and lead to a schism within the
Karen leadership.

Although the DKBA had no ceasefire agreement with the regime, it soon became a proxy force of the
Burma Army and was used to launch a number of attacks against Karen refugees in Thailand and on
the KNLA itself. Despite the fact that the regime had constantly used the DKBA to fight against
fellow Karen, a number of other KNLA leaders from under units broke away to form new factions.

In February 1997, Lt Col. Thu Muh Heh commander of the 16th Battalion, 6th Brigade surrendered and
formed the Karen Peace Army (later Force). A year later, Padoh Aung San, the former KNU Forestry
Minister, also surrendered taking with him a large portion of the KNU’s coffers. The last split
occurred in January 2007, when the leader of the KNU’s 7th Brigade split to form the KNU/KNLA
Peace Council and officially sign an agreement with the Burmese regime.

While Karen factions were able to practice some form of autonomous control in their areas, the lives
of Karen villagers under their control either changed little or became worse. Human rights abuses
continued and villagers were forced to pay taxes to a number of different factions, and the Burma
Army, thus further adding to the burden.

1 Notes from minutes taken at the 2nd BGF meeting held at LID22 H.Q. Pa-an, 8 October 2010

2 Ibid.

3 Notes from minutes taken at the 1st BGF meeting held at LID22 H.Q. Pa-an, 6 October 2010

4 Ibid.

5 Karen Strategic Studies Group

6 There has been some confusion in regards to the naming of some DKBA Battalions. Lah Pwe had formerly
commanded 907 and 906 Battalions and the DKBA had been designated under the brigade structure of 555,
333 and 999. Although the date is unclear, these brigade areas were designated as numbers 1 to 5.
Telephone conversation via translator with Colonel Lah Pwe, 9 January 2011

7 ‘Karen Armies Unite to Face Threat of War’, Alex Ellgee, The Irrawaddy, 7 August 2010

8 Ibid

9 ‘Myawaddy ‘not overrun by breakaway DKBA group’’, Mizzima, 7 November 2010

10 ‘Myawaddy police besieged by DKBA troops’, Mizzima, 21 September 2010

11 ‘DKBA renegades seize border town’, Naw Noreen, DVB, 7 November 2010

12 Personal conversation with KNU official, 19 November 2010

13 Telephone conversation (via translator) with Colonel Lah Pwe, 9 January 2011. One KNU official has noted
that it is common for most Burmese authorities to threaten civilians when they want something. It is unlikely
therefore that such a threat, in context, would be the sole reason for the DKBA to seize the town, especially if
Kyaw Thet had already announced his intention prior to the 7th of November.

14 Telephone conversation via translator with DKBA Tactical Operations Commander, 9 January 2011

15 ‘KNU terrorists shell Myawady, Phaya Thonsu, leaving some innocent people dead, injured’, NLM, 10
November 2010

16 Ibid.

17 ‘KNU Statement Condemning Election Related Violence in Burma’s Border Areas’, KNU, 10 October 2010

18 ‘FBR Report: School girl killed, villagers wounded and hundreds displaced as the Burma Army continues
attacks in Central Karen State.’, Free Burma Rangers, 20 November 2010

19 ‘DKBA Property searched, confiscated.’, Naw Noreen, DVB, 15 October 2010

20 ‘Update on the Conflict and Displacement of Civilians along the Thai-Burma Border’, Back Pack Health
Worker Team (BPHWT), 15 February 2011

21 http://www.khrg.org/khrg2011/khrg11f1_update.html#47 accessed 19 January 2011

22 ‘Situation Report: Promoting the Protection of Newly Displaced Civilians Affected by Conflict and Increased
Insecurities on the Thai-Burma Border Mid-December 2010 to 11th January 2011’, Back Pack Health Worker
Team (BPHWT), 12 January 2010

23 ‘Eight Armed Group Members Exchange Arms for Peace’, New Light of Myanmar, 15 March 2010

24 See ‘Economic Analysis and Vision of the NLD’, NLD, 4 January 2011

25 ‘Regular Sessions of the First Region and State Hluttaw held Members of the Legislative Committee and
National Races Committee nominated.’ New Light of Myanmar, 2 March 2010

26 Ibid

27 ‘Extrajudicial execution of two civilians in Pa'an District’, KHRG, 15 February 2011

28 ‘The Shan of Burma’, C.T. Yawnghwe, ISEAS, 1987 p. 99

29 See the Aung San-Attlee agreement clause 8 reproduced in Rhododendron, Vol. 4 No 1, 2003, CHRO, p. 8

30 A earlier meeting, the first Panglong Conference, had occurred in March 1946

31 It must be noted that the 1947 constitution did not allow the Kachins to secede. See Union of Burma,
Constitution, 1947, Chapter IX, 178

32 Forerunner of the Karen National Union and a member of the AFPFL

33 Union of Burma, Constitution, 1947, Chapter X, 202

After the 2008 constitution was approved it soon became clear that all armed groups remaining
inside Burma would be ordered to convert their armies into Burma Army controlled Border Guard
Forces (BGFs). While most ceasefire groups have resisted such moves, most of the remaining Karen
factions have agreed and therefore have come under direct control of the Burma Army.

NOTES
34 San Po Thin, a leading KCO member, had originally advised Saw Ba U Gyi to resign from the AFPFL. ‘A Just
Country - The Karen of Burma : History, Identity, and Conflict’, unpublished manuscript, Paul Keenan, 2009,
p155

35 The Sitwundan units were originally recruited in 17 districts, 6 of which were Karen. They were further
expanded and by 1949 there were 26 battalion comprising 13,000 troops. ‘Making Enemies: War and State
Building in Burma’, Mary P Callaghan, Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 128

36 ‘A Journalist, A General and an Army in Burma’, U Thaung, White Lotus, 1995, p. 15

37 ‘Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948’, Bertil Lintner, White Lotus, 1994, p. 376