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05/24/2012: "We the People Accountability needed on Naga Reconciliation Editorial: MorungExpress"

We the People Accountability needed on Naga Reconciliation Editorial: MorungExpress

Ever since the epic Naga Reconciliation meeting held on February 29, 2012, one of the biggest Naga public gathering in recent times, called by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR), many important resolutions have been made and endorsed by the Naga public. All this was also highlighted in the local media. One of the oft repeated resolution, which has been perhaps modified to factor in the new reality, states that the “historical and political rights of the Nagas should form the basis of any political solution and that any negotiation process must focus on how Nagas can determine, safeguard and exercise their historical and political rights in a contemporary and inter-related world”.

The meeting also resolved for immediate cessation of armed confrontations and hostilities between Naga political groups and the leaders present, in their speeches affirmed that they were committed to reconciliation. All these things have been made known to the Naga people raising new hope and expectation. Even the FNR Convenor was optimistic that the “Naga political groups have torn down the wall of separation built over time by accumulated hatred, bitterness, malice and slander”. So in that sense the February 29 meeting was successful as it brought the different stakeholders together and helped in drawing up some form of a roadmap in order to assist in taking the reconciliation process forward and also forming some kind of consensus on the Naga political talks with the Government of India.

Now obviously the negative developments appearing in the newspapers such as cancellation of the latest Chiang Mai peace meet has raised concern among the people. How far the process has moved on (ever since the February 29 public meeting) is not known to the people. It is for the FNR and the concern groups to honestly reflect where they are going. But our question is also this: shouldn’t the people also have the right to know what is going on with all the resolution about, ‘Naga concordant’, ‘shared future’, ‘one nation one people’ etc.
If people are indeed supreme and ‘sovereignty lies with the people’, then the Naga groups must listen to the voice of the people or revert back to the people if they are faced with some difficulty. It is also high time that the Naga people get some update about the decision taken sometime in August 2011 by top leaders of the three political groups—NSCN/GPRN, GPRN/NSCN and NNC/FGN who had publicly resolved to push ahead with the formation of one Naga National Government. And to expedite this process of eventually forming the Naga National Government, a High Level Commission of the three groups was formed and it was decided that it shall hold meetings without any further delay in the presence of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation as facilitators. It is now nine months and high time to talk about the progress made.
Then around this same time another six point joint statement was signed on August 25, 2011 by the three political groups. Among the significant decisions taken, included the resolve that “any interim arrangement of the political rights of the Nagas shall be outside of the purview of the Indian Constitution per se”. Also it “affirms to work for the territorial integrity of all Nagas”. It also “Agreed to Strengthen and Broaden the Peace Process based on the Uniqueness of Naga History”.

So you see there has been a lot of a resolution made, joint statements signed etc. but the question also arises whether we are following them or making the effort to stand by our declaration. Naga people are not so demanding or unreasonable but they do want to see some accountability otherwise the credibility of the current processes come under doubt and people’s faith in our leaders will be shaken.
'Contradictory statements confusing Nagas' Morung Express
| Dimapur The NSCN Khaplang has stated that the “postponement of the proposed Chiang Mai meet on 21st May 2012 and the contradictory statements by the Khole-Kitovi groups are confusing the Nagas with the latest controversial press statement by the so-called envoy of the collective leadership Alezo Venuh on 16th May last”. A press note from the MIP mentioned that during the many meetings of the three (3) groups i.e. NSCN/GPRN, GPRN/NSCN and FGN, Kitovi had “categorically stated time and again that his group stands for the Nagas of Nagaland”.

“Therefore it should not be a surprise for the NSCN (IM) as they are also well aware of the Khole-Kitovi groups stand in this regard however the more confusing statement by the Kitovi group’s envoy Alezo claiming their stand as that for the entire Naga inhabited areas encompassing all Nagas within and outside including international boundaries is to be viewed seriously as Kitovi and Alezo are trying to confuse the Nagas and take them for a ride”, the MIP note stated.
Why India is wary of Myanmar-NSCN-K agreement
The ceasefire agreement between a Naga rebel faction and Myanmar was signed without India being informed.
It is likely to have long-term implications for India's northeast and Myanmar, says Rahul Mishra.
The first in a series on India-Myanamar relations, as Prime Minister Manmohan SingH visits that country on May 27, the first visit by an Indian leader in many years.
Taking another step forward to pacify decades-old ethnic unrest and bring back the marginalised ethnic communities to mainstream politics, the Thein Sein-led Myanmar government signed a ceasefire agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang in Myanmar.
Signed on April 9, the agreement paves the way for autonomy to the NSCN-K in three districts: Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun, which fall in Sagaing -- a northwestern administrative region of Myanmar.
The agreement also provides NSCN-K members with the freedom to move 'unarmed' across the country. Moreover, as per the ceasefire agreement, the group is allowed to open a sub-office in Hkamti district.
It has also been reported that NSCN-K is trying to acquire more rights in the Naga areas of Kachin and Sagaing region.
Interestingly, Myanmar's 2008 constitution provides for the grouping together of Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun in a Naga self-administrative zone, which proves beyond doubt that the autonomy deal is part of a comprehensive plan of Nay Pyi Taw rather than an ad-hoc move.
The most promising aspect of the deal is that it might put an end to ethnic hostilities in coming days and give peace a chance in dispute resolution.
The agreement is widely projected as an achievement by both the parties involved. While the Thein Sein government is taking it as another feather in its cap, the NSCN-K projects the agreement as a stepping stone to become a trans-nationally recognised ethnic group.
From the statements of NSCN-K leaders, it is evident that they look at the Kurdish group Peshmerga -- which has signed peace deals with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey -- as a role model for themselves. The NSCN-K considers it as one of their cherished objectives. Clearly, with the inking of the deal, the group has inched closer to its long-term objective.
The decision, which has invoked mixed responses from both within and outside, is likely to have long-term implications not only on the ethnic politics of the Naga-inhabited regions, but also for India's northeast and Myanmar.
Incidentally, the other two significant players in the Naga politics -- THE NSCN-IM (Isak Muivah) and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi have expressed their displeasure, although citing different reasons. For the record, all three factions have different visions for Nagaland.
While the NSCN-IM wants the incorporation of neighbouring Naga-inhabited areas with existing boundaries of Nagaland and the NSCN-K aims to incorporate Myanmarese Naga with Nagaland, NSCN-Khole-Kitovi, to a great extent, holds a status quo-ist position on the boundary demarcation of Nagaland.
By virtue of being an immediate neighbour infested by the insurgent groups, India is likely to get affected by the new twist in the situation.
Considering that India was not informed beforehand of the NSCN-K or the Myanmar agreement, it did not go well within the Indian establishment.
To be sure, India renewed the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K in early May, only after seeking numerous clarifications regarding the NSCN-K-Myanmar agreement.
In order to pre-empt any unpleasant situation along the borders, the Indian authorities have clearly stated that India does not want the NSCN-K to overtly or covertly support insurgents operating from outside the country.
India has imposed conditions on the NSCN-K, as part of the ceasefire agreement to ensure that insurgent groups like the Paresh Barua-led United Liberation Front of Asom and the Manipur-based Peoples Liberation Army do not use the NSCN-K controlled region of Myanmar for anti-India activities.
The conditions include: First, strictly adhere to ceasefire ground rules; secondly, do not extend any help to anti-India insurgent groups; thirdly, make all possible efforts to stop factional killings and refrain from violence; and finally, 45 of the group's top functionaries will have to carry hologram-bearing identity cards, so that their whereabouts are kept track of during the ceasefire.
New Delhi's [ Images ] apprehensions seem justified as it has been reported lately that at least 14 rebel groups from the region had congregated at the NSCN-K's base in Myanmar to forge a united front to fight Indian forces.
To cap the NSCN-K's capabilities and influence in inflicting damage in the future, India is mulling over the initiation of a dialogue with the NSCN-Khole-Kitovi, which is seemingly the only faction intending to solve the problem within the present boundaries of Nagaland. The dialogue process is likely to commence in June.
Analysts have also indicated towards an emerging policy trend in India -- to use the NSCN-Khole-Kitovi and NSCN-IM as forces to counter an ambitious NSCN-K. One may argue that noting their relatively weaker position in Nagaland, the NSCN-K agreed to all the conditions imposed by India.
Evidently, the NSCN-K stronghold is Myanmar, whereas the NSCN-Khole-Kitovi and NSCN-IM are more powerful in India. Ongoing feuds among these groups have limited their capabilities in dealing with India.
Furthermore, India has also sought details from Myanmar about the deal during a regional border meeting of the two countries held recently.
India is likely to take up the matter again with the Thein Sein government during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Myanmar from May 27 to 29.
Considering the current situation, the NSCN-K-Myanmar peace deal is likely to remain confined within the borders of Myanmar. Nonetheless, it is highly likely that the NSCN-K might try to use the agreement with Myanmar as a bargaining chip in dealing with India.
However, it would be naive to think that India would yield to such pressure tactics. This is evident from the fact that India not only inquired about the NSCN-K's deal with the Myanmar government and firmly imposed conditions on the NSCN-K, but also categorically said that it would not tolerate any cross-border insurgency that involves the NSCN-K.
One may say that the time is ripe for India and Myanmar to endeavour to beef up the joint mechanism to deal with insurgency issues. Both India and Myanmar will have to make sure that the objectives of gaining short-term peace do not hamper their long-term national security interests.
While one cannot deny the possibility of the agreement leading to a greater understanding for more mature talks, ethnic reconciliation, and long-lasting peace in Myanmar -- there are several concerns which cannot be overlooked.
It goes without saying that India has to put its act together and tread a cautious path in dealing with northeast insurgent groups.
A long-lasting and peaceful resolution will have to be arrived at sooner than later.
Rahul Mishra is a researcher specialising on Southeast Asian affairs at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi.
Manipur-Nagaland border tense over cutting water pipeline Hueiyen News Service
Imphal, May 23 2012: Tension prevailed between the villagers of Tuingam Paomata village of Manipur and Leishami village of Nagaland on May 18 over alleged breaking and cutting of water pipelines for Tuingam Paomata village under Tadubi Police Station by Leishami villagers.

The incident occured when villagers of Leishami village of Nagaland axed the GI pipes which were laid by villagers of Tuingam Paomata to store water from a place located at the border of Manipur and Nagaland.

The water reservoir was scheduled to be inaugurated on May 19, before it was found axed and broken by Leishami villagers.

Enraged over the act, Tuingam villagers went to clash with Leishami villagers with many weapons.

However, Senapati SP, Puspanjali and DC Pradeep Shah interrupted them and persuaded them to remain silent.

Following the incident, a joint meeting of the leaders of the two villages with DCs of both districts of Manipur and Nagaland was held on May 21 .

It may be mentioned that Tuingam village of Manipur is neighbouring with Kheijik village of Nagaland and the two villages have no enmity between them.

They have been living peacefully since long.

However, the cuttings of pipelines were carried out by Leishami villagers, which settled at a short distance from Kheijik village.

Police is keeping a close watch at Tuingam village to prevent any unwanted activities.
The 12 point agreement Shan Herald The 12 point agreement 19 May 2012
Union level Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) – Restoration Council of Shan State / Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) (Unofficial version)
Note The official version deals with military maters in several pages. Even SHAN editor, who was there as a consultant, has not been given a copy of it. The following therefore is a gist, not word by word translation, of the agreement. It there is any mistake, the blame is SHAN’s alone.
1. The RCSS/SSA plan to cooperate in the eradication of illicit drugs is heartily received by the UPWC to be forwarded to the President for consideration
2. The two sides will conduct a joint field survey
3. The government will assist families of the RCSS/SSA members to earn adequate means of livelihood
4. The government will assist the RCSS/SSA in the preservation and promotion of Shan literature and culture
5. The RCSS/SSA is permitted to request assistance from and coordinate with NGOs and INGOs
6. The RCSS/SSA will be allowed to register its Tai Freedom news agency after the new media law comes into effect
7. Members and supporters of RCSS/SSA who are in prison will be released except for those who have been imprisoned on criminal charges
8. A peace monitoring group will be formed before the end of July 2012 after nomination by the two sides of suitable persons
9. The two sides will continue to build up mutual trust to enable the RCSS/SSA to be totally withdrawn from the list of unlawful associations
10. A special industrial zone will be set up in the area controlled by the RCSS/SSA
11. The RCSS/SSA is free to hold political consultations with individuals, groups and communities throughout the country
12. National ID cards will be issued to members, family members and people residing with the RCSS/SSA
Myanmar protesters test boundaries Reuters
FLEXING DEMOCRATIC MUSCLE: Demonstrators holding candles protest in Yangon against power blackouts across Myanmar.
As long-isolated Myanmar opens up, its people are flexing their newly democratic muscles and testing the boundaries of freedom in a series of protests over chronic power outages. On Tuesday evening (local time), several hundred people in the commercial capital Yangon marched at Sule Pagoda, the focal point of demonstrations in 2007 and 1988 that were crushed by the military which ruled for nearly half a century until last year.
About 1,000 people protested for a third straight evening in northern Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city, the biggest demonstrations since a 2007 monk-led uprising in which dozens were killed and hundreds arrested.
"We have plans to hold similar protests in all these cities tonight," rights activist Ko Htin Kyaw, an organizer, said on Wednesday.
The protests pose a difficult test for reformist President Thein Sein who has freed hundreds of political prisoners, relaxed state censorship, started peace talks with ethnic minority rebel groups and held historic by-elections that catapulted Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party into a semi-civilian parliament.
Bread-and-butter issues have been known to turn violent in Myanmar, also known as Burma. The biggest and bloodiest uprisings against military rule, in 1988 and 2007, were sparked by discontent over soaring inflation and fuel prices.
But Thein Sein, a former general, has stunned the world with the most dramatic reforms in the former British colony since a 1962 military coup, including authorizing peaceful protests though authorities must be notified days in advance.
"The government is in a very difficult position now," said Aung Thu Nyein, a Myanmar economist who moved to Thailand after taking part in demonstrations two decades ago.
"These protests are both a sign of dissatisfaction about public services and how the opening of democratic space is making interest groups more active than before."
But the demonstrations have gone smoothly with no arrests, and no unrest. In Yangon, police watched as protesters stuck candles in front of a gold Buddhist shrine, chanting prayers for electricity, but they did nothing to stop them.

"UNFAIR AGREEMENTS"
The protesters accuse the former military government of enriching themselves at the public's expense by selling natural gas to neighbouring China while Myanmar, among Asia's poorest nations, faces frequent power outages. They want the new government to amend those deals, so more natural gas can be used domestically to offset the shortfall.
"Our country is abundantly rich in natural gas but the former military regime sold it to foreign countries without any consideration for the people," said activist Ko Htin Kyaw, 49.
"Now the present government, being elected by the people, should try to do something to amend these unfair agreements so enough electricity can be supplied inside the country."
He and other protesters were on Tuesday evening nearly outnumbered by enthusiastic crowds of domestic media covering an event that would have been off limits to journalists for decades.
As the protesters walked around the pagoda, they were trailed by dozens of clicking cameras. Hundreds of onlookers gathered, blocking traffic, to watch the curious site of a protest held freely without police intervention.
The rallies began Sunday night in Mandalay. They spread to Monywa, about 130km to the northwest, on Monday and then to Yangon, the commercial capital, on Tuesday. Activists used social networking site Facebook to get the word out.
About 50 protesters were briefly questioned by authorities in Mandalay, said Thein Aung Myint, 39, an organiser of the Mandalay protests.
"The police asked us who was behind us and the purpose of the protests. I told them nobody was behind us. We just staged the protest to demand enough supply of electricity."
No one was arrested, he said. State media sought to explain the outages, which have reduced supplies to just four or five hours of power a day in Mandalay.
It said Myanmar had 18 hydro-power stations, one coal-fired power plant and 10 gas-fired power stations supplying the country of 60 million people. Those plants have been generating about 1,340 megawatts during a recent drought - while power consumption has been as high as 1,850 megawatts.
A bomb blast blamed on ethnic Kachin rebels at a power plant further reduced supplies, by about 200 megawatts, state media said, citing data from Ministry of Electrical Power-2. "Because of the drought, it's highly unlikely to be fixed soon," said Aung Thu Nyein, the economist.
Plans were under way, the government said, to build more plants in a project with US conglomerate General Electric Co and construction and mining-equipment maker Caterpillar Inc. Both companies have said they would like to expand in Myanmar following a suspension of US sanctions last week.
Education is Key to Burmese Reforms By SAW KAPI| Irrawaddy Children gather for school in the village of Tar-Pu, in the mountains of Shan State in January 2012. (PHOTO: Reuters)
The chief economic advisor to Burma’s President Thein Sein and head of Myanmar Development Resource Institute (MDRI), Sayar U Myint, recently penned a very thorough and thought-provoking open letter, calling for the reopening of Rangoon University including the historically significant, nonetheless politically controversial, Student Union building.
As a former student activist, I was moved and energized by such a public statement. All the simple yet convincing points he outlined in the letter as to why and how the nation’s foremost public institution of higher learning should be restored trigger me to think further and deeper about the role of our education system as a whole in the context of the current reform process.
The conventional wisdom is that without a good education system, the country will not have the skilled labor force it needs. Insufficient domestic human resources will then require the country to import skilled professionals and experts from abroad.
This scenario is dangerous and it can significantly impede any economic reform effort in the long run. In fact, initiating economic reform without the necessary “knowledge infrastructure,” not to mention the much needed physical infrastructure, is simply short-sighted.
Therefore human resource development is a priority. Yet the point I want to draw our attention to is a more subtle and sensitive one—the role education can play in building social capital that the country has been so deficient in, due to decades of ethnic conflict and civil war.
The Myanmar government obviously understands that the education sector is of strategic and political importance. It is very unfortunate, however that, the current education system in the country maintains educational objectives for public schools that emphasize primarily on Burman values, history and culture, and thereby effectively ignores the country’s rich ethnic cultures, values and history.
Both the policy and practices of the current education system in the country affirm the subordinate status of minority ethnic nationalities.
A good example of this is the almost complete absence of ethnic history in public school curricula. The teaching of multi-ethnic culture and lessons about the contributions ethnic nationalities have made in the social and political progress of the country is also minimal.
As a result, the majority Burman [Bamar] population has little or no idea about the country’s ethnic diversity, let alone the respect and appreciation for their languages and cultures. The only opportunity they have to learn about ethnic people is through the state media’s portrayal of ethnic nationalities as insurgents and separatists whose ultimate intent is to destroy and disintegrate the Union.
There is a crucial need to respond to the deficiency of knowledge and appreciation of ethnic languages, histories and cultures. The government must make the building of social capital an essential aspect of educational reform. In doing so, the education reform process should be broad-based and all-inclusive.
There are a few things the president can initiate immediately to embark on a genuine reform process with a desire to achieving both economic and political progress. First, it should start with an effort to constitutionally encourage and support the teaching of ethnic history and languages in public secondary school curricula.
Secondly, just as we have the University of Foreign Languages in Myanmar, it is only practical that we also invest in the establishment of a full-fledged University of Ethnic Languages and Cultural Studies, where Myanmar’s rich ethnic cultures and languages are studied, researched and preserved. This will be a great symbol of equality and respect for the country’s ethnic diversity. And it should be done as part of overall education reform.
To achieve long-lasting benefits, Burmese education sector reform must focus on both developing human capital and promoting the value of cultural diversity and ethnic harmony. Only a reform that is broad-based and inclusive will help and, in the long run, reduce economic inequality and foster a more open and harmonious society. After all, an effective and progressive educational system is essential for economic and social development, laying the groundwork for national reconciliation with diverse ethnic nationalities and building a functional union.
Saw Kapi, a former political activist and an ethnic Karen, is a university administrator currently working as the Director of Admissions and Records at California State University, Bakersfield. The opinions expressed in this guest commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Irrawaddy.
United Nations Resolutions on Kashmir ■Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948
■Resolution of the Commission of August 13, 1948
■Resolution of the Commission of January 5, 1949
■Resolution of the Security Council of March 14, 1950
■Resolution of the Security Council of March 30, 1951
■Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 765th meeting on 24 January 1957, concerning the India–Pakistan Question
■Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 20 September 1965
Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948 The Security Council, Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir; Having heard the representation of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan; Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting; Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, Reaffirms the Council's resolution of 17 January; Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the resolution of the Council of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, representatives of . . . . and . . . .and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may designate such other Member of Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five; Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian Subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution, and to this end, Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. A. RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER 1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavors: (a) to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State; (b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order. 2. The Government of India should: (a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order: (b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announces the completion of each stage; (c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles: (i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the States; (ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas; (iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area. 3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator. 4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7. 5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification. B. PLEBISCITE 6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out. 7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administra-tion to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. 8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police. 9. The Government of India should, at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions. 10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator; (b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite; (d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates; (e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite. 11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing, any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir. 12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit. 13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavors to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose. 14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that: (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens; (b) There is no victimization; (c) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection. 15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial. C. GENERAL PROVISIONS 16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task. 17. The commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. 18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein . ..................................................................................................................... Resolution of the Commission of August 13, 1948 The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavors to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal: PART I Cease-fire order A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments. B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.(For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.) C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire. D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order. E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. PART II Truce agreement Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission. A 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State. 2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. 3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. B 1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. 2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary. 3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed. C 1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiqué containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission will be made public. PART III The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured. .................................................................... Resolution of the Commission of January 5, 1949 The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948: 1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; 2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed; 3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. (b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. (c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff of assistants and observes as he may require. 4. (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. (b) As regards the territory referred to in A.2 of Part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities. 5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for the holding of the plebiscite. 6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect. (b) All person (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State. 7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, that: (a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite; (b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit; (c) All political prisoners are released; (d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection; and (e) There is no victimization. 8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and the Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted; 9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial; 10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations; Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight of 1 January 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived at as provided for by the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948; and Resolves to return in the immediate future to the Sub-continent to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Resolution of 13 August 1948 and by the foregoing principles. ............................................................................................ Resolution of the Security Council of March 14, 1950 The Security Council, Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, established by the resolutions of 20 January and 21 April 1948 Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L. McNaughton on the outcome of his discussion with the representatives of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the decision taken by the Security Council on 17 December 1949 Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesmanlike action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for a cease-fire, for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these resolutions by • The Cessation of hostilities affected 1 January 1949; • The establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July, and • The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite Administrator, Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarization of the State and for the expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants, 1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programmer of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed; 2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate: (a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization, (b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before these Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir? (c) To exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, (d) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitarization for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between the parties, (e) To report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make; 3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to ensure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed, and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations; 4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton for their arduous and fruitful labours; 5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan shall be terminated, and decides that this shall take place one month after both parties have informed the United Nations Representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him of the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above. ............................................................................................. Resolution of the Security Council of March 30, 1951: Having received and noted the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950; Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and of the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950, and have re-affirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations; Observing that on 27 October 1950 the General Council of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference” adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the “future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir”; observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from which such a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir; Reminding the Governments and Authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14 March 1950 and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations; Affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference,” and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle; Declaring its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance to the maintenance of international peace and security; Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were: (a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and (b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite; The Security Council, 1. Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission; 2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon; 3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the Sub-continent and , after consulation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949; 4. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; 5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the Sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out; 6.Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations Representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 above; such arbitration to be carried out by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties; 7. Decides that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in the State; 8. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as may be necessary in carrying out the terms of this resolution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 765th meeting on 24 January 1957, concerning the India–Pakistan Question: The resolution is a reaffirmation of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 that the convening of a Constituent Assembly and any action taken by it would not constitute disposition of the State in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It was introduced by Australia, Colombia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., and supported by 10 members of the Council, the Soviet Union abstaining. The Security Council, Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Reminding the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its resolutions of 21 April 1948 (S/726), 3 June 1948 , 14 March 1950 (S/1469) and 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev. 1), and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para. 75) and 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15), that the final disposition of that State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, 1. Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution of 30 March 1951 and declares that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference' and any action that Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the Assembly, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principles; 2. Decides to continue its consideration of the dispute. 24 January 1957 ......................................................................................... Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 20 September 1965 : The Security Council; 1. demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel; 3. calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area; 4. Decides to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution of Sept. 6 has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council thereon. Copyright (c) 2005 - 2009 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan
Search for quality mithuns in Northeast’s mountains Indian Express
Scientists at the National Research Centre on Mithun (NRCM) at Jharnapani in Nagaland have broken new grounds by carrying out a successful embryo transfer, leading to the birth of the first ever mithun calf through this method. Mohan, as the newly-born calf has been christened, was delivered by a healthy female mithun on May 12 after she played the role of a surrogate mother.
“It is a landmark case, especially because the population of this animal is not in a comfortable status. The embryo transfer technology (ETT) that we resorted to will definitely help propagate quality germplasm of this magnificent species of animal,” says NRCM principal scientist K K Baruah. The NRCM in Nagaland is one of the several such research centres for different animals under the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR).
Similar efforts have been successfully carried out on cow, sheep, goat and horse, but this is the first time such an experiment has succeeded on mithun, claims Baruah. “Mithuns being exposed to the wild have been suffering from cross-breeding as well as in-breeding, posing a major threat to this animal so dear to the tribal communities in the Northeastern states. The ETT method has raised hopes of creating a quality stock of mithuns,” says Baruah.
Others who worked in the ETT team were NRCM director Chandan Rajkhowa, senior scientists M Mondal and Bhaskar Bora, while B C Sarmah, B C Deka and D J Dutta from the College of Veterinary Sciences, Guwahati, and Dr P Chakraborty from NRC on Yak in Dirang (Arunachal Pradesh).
Mithun (Bos frontalis) is the domesticated form of gaur (Bos gaurus) and is often referred to as the “ship of the highland” or “cattle of the mountains”. It is an example of the integration of agro-ecology, subsistence livelihood, culture and livestock rearing. People, however, mostly do not keep them at home, and let them remain in the jungles. They are reared under free range condition in dense forests in a very unique manner, with zero input, at altitudes ranging from 300 to 3,000 metres above sea level.
The last census conducted for mithuns in 2007 had put the number of this animal at around 2.64 lakh, of which Arunachal Pradesh alone had roughly 82 per cent of them. Nagaland (12.6%), Manipur (3.8%) and Mizoram (0.8%) are the other states where mithuns can be seen. While mithun is also consumed as meat, its milk is very rich in fat, proteins and other nutrients, compared to other milch animals. Moreover, its hides, when processed, give one of the best quality leathers.
The NRCM that has been engaged in propagation of mithuns in the region has been working on this project for the last five years. “Since mithuns are largely used as a meat animal, it is very important to promote better animals, which we have been trying to do through preservation and propagation of quality germ-plasm,” says Baruah.
Healthy female mithuns ovulate every 21 days, and give birth to one calf a year. “But since a sizeable population of female mithuns are not in a state of normal ovulation, we think converting them to surrogate mothers by ETT will lead to faster multiplication of mithuns,” he adds.
Comparing ETT to artificial insemination, Baruah says while the latter process only spreads superior male genetics across a herd of animals, embryo transfer technology would now help spread superior female genetics across a specific herd or even in many herds. “Moreover, each of these offspring like Mohan would potentially carry superior traits of the original mother, such as increased weight gain and more milk apart from disease control,” he adds.